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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MEGAN ERIN BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43552
Ada County Case No.
CR-2012-5592

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Is Baker’s sentencing challenge barred by the doctrine of invited error?

Baker’s Sentencing Challenge Is Barred By The Doctrine Of Invited Error
Baker pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (R., p.13.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court
suspended Baker’s sentence and placed her on supervised probation for seven years.
(R., pp.13-18.)
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Approximately two months later, the state filed a motion for probation violation
alleging that Baker had violated the conditions of her probation by failing to attend
and/or complete the Chrysalis Program, using methamphetamine on two separate
occasions, consuming alcohol, changing residences without permission on three
separate occasions, using “Spice” and “Bath Salts,” failing to report for supervision on
several occasions, absconding supervision, and failing to pay her court-ordered
financial obligations. (R., pp.19-22.) Baker was at large for over two years before she
was located and apprehended. (R., pp.32-33.) Baker subsequently admitted that she
had violated the conditions of her probation by failing to attend and/or complete the
Chrysalis Program, using methamphetamine on two separate occasions, changing
residences without permission, and absconding supervision, and the state withdrew the
remaining allegations. (R., pp.20-21, 41.) While Baker was on pretrial release pending
the disposition hearing for her probation violation, the state filed a second motion for
probation violation alleging that Baker had violated the conditions of her probation by
failing to report to her supervising officer upon being released from the jail, failing to
report to Probation and Parole for orientation and to submit to DNA collection, failing to
report for supervision on several occasions, failing to submit to UA testing on two
separate occasions, failing to maintain employment, and again absconding supervision.
(R., pp.42, 52-54.) Pursuant to an agreement with the state, Baker stipulated to a
“prison sentence” in exchange for the state’s agreement to withdraw the second motion
for probation violation. (R., p.61; 8/17/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-11.) The district court revoked
Baker’s probation and ordered her underlying sentence executed.
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(R., pp.63-65.)

Baker filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order revoking probation.
(R., pp.71-73.)
“Mindful that [she] agreed to be sentenced to prison,” Baker nevertheless asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her probation because she “could
continue receiving the help she needs to avoid relapsing again while she resides in the
community.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)

Baker’s claim of an abuse of sentencing

discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error.
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a
ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was
error. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The
purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who “caused or played an
important role in prompting a trial court” to take a particular action from “later
challenging that decision on appeal.” State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117,
120 (1999). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during
trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).
On appeal, Baker acknowledges that she “stipulated to the execution of the
previously suspended sentence in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the second
motion for probation violation” and that, at the disposition hearing, she told the district
court that she was “okay with having [her] time imposed.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5, n.3;
10/29/15 Tr., p.13, L.11.)

Because Baker both stipulated to, and subsequently

consented to, having her probation revoked and the underlying sentence executed, she
cannot claim on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by doing exactly that.
Therefore, Baker’s claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine
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of invited error and the district court’s order revoking probation and ordering Baker’s
underlying sentence executed should be affirmed.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
revoking Baker’s probation and ordering the underlying sentence executed.

DATED this 18th day of March, 2016.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming _________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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